Cooperative behaviour is widespread in nature, but explaining how cooperation evolves constitutes a major scientific challenge. Simulation models has shown that social network structure plays a key role in rendering cooperation evolutionarily stable. However, not much is known about the importance of initial conditions for the evolution of cooperation in networks. Knowledge about this is essential for judging to which extent results from modelling and experiments can tell us something about the real world. Here, we investigate how cooperation is affected by the initial network positions of cooperators in different networks, by means of game-theory based simulation models. We find that placing cooperators on high-degree nodes enhances cooperation in standard scale-free networks but not in standard Poisson networks. In contrast, under increased degree assortativity, Poisson networks can maintain high levels of cooperation, even exceeding those of scale-free networks, when the initial placement of cooperators is perfectly correlated to node degree. When the correlation is not perfect however, defectors placed within clusters of cooperators can act as Trojan horses, allowing defection to invade. The results are relevant both to computer simulations of cooperation in networks and in particular to real-world cooperation experiments, where the number of replications is typically low and stochastic initial correlations between cooperativeness and network position may be present.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation, understood as behaviour where individuals help others at a cost to themselves, has long constituted a major conundrum for science. Cooperative behaviour seemingly contradicts the central prediction of Darwinian evolutionary theory that individuals will behave in ways that maximise their own gain. Nevertheless, cooperation is found widely across species, including humans, other mammals, fish, birds, insects, and microscopic organisms [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Explaining the evolution of cooperation has been called one of the biggest scientific challenges of our time [7] .
While cooperation among relatives can be understood via kin selection theory [8] , cooperation among nonrelatives is harder to explain. During recent decades, it has become clear that social network structure (i.e. who interacts with whom) plays an essential role for understanding the evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Computer simulations have shown that while cooperation does not persist in unstructured populations, certain network structures can promote and stabilise it (e.g. [9] [10] [11] [12] ). Across animal species, social networks found in nature are indeed structured [13] , and the study of cooperation in networks thus provides a promising avenue towards understanding how cooperation may evolve in nature.
A large body of work has investigated the effect of different network parameters on the evolution of cooper- * bohrbrask@gmail.com ation via computer simulation (see [14, 15] for reviews). Some factors which have been found to have important effects include degree heterogeneity [16] , degree distribution [10, 17] , average degree [12] , degree assortativity [18] , network clustering [11] , and modularity [19] . However, while the role of network structure thus has been extensively investigated, the effect of initial conditions has received relatively little attention [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . Initial conditions here include the initial frequency of cooperators in the population, and the initial network positions of cooperators and defectors (i.e. the way in which the strategies are initially distributed to the nodes).
Here, we investigate how initial correlations between strategy and network position affect the evolution of cooperation in networks. This can inform us about the general importance of initial conditions for cooperation in structured populations and is relevant in real-world situations where the initial conditions can be observed or are constructed. For example, in experiments with humans playing cooperation games (e.g. [25] [26] [27] [28] ), initial stochastic correlations between cooperativeness and network position could potentially have a significant effect and could influence the conclusions of the experiments, in particular because the number of replications in such experiments for practical reasons is typically low. Knowing the effect of initial conditions are also important for judging the robustness of conclusions from simulation studies and thereby their relevance for the real world.
games where each player adopts one of a limited number of strategies which may be more cooperative or more selfish. The game is played repeatedly and players adapt their strategies to optimise their performance. Alternatively, each iteration can be interpreted as a reproductive generation, so that the adaptation is genetic. With this framework, it becomes possible to study the stability and dynamics of cooperation in populations over time (including evolutionary time).
Most of our current knowledge about the role of social structure for the evolution of cooperation comes from simulation of game-theoretical models in networks (see [14, 15] for reviews). In such models, individuals are represented by the nodes of a network, and the links in the network determine who interacts with whom. A key outcome of the models is the frequency of individuals adopting a cooperative strategy (cooperators) in the population over time. The simulations most often begin with 50 percent cooperators, which are randomly distributed to the nodes. In other words, initially half the population are cooperators, which are randomly positioned in the network [14, 15] .
We specifically study the effect of initial correlations between strategy and node degree, by means of gametheory based simulation models. We focus on degree because this is a fundamental measure of network position that is easily interpretable (as the number of interaction partners an individual has). We study this in Poisson networks (also called random networks) and scale-free networks, two network types commonly used in models of cooperation and characterised by different degree distributions [14, 15] . In Poisson networks, most individuals have degrees close to the mean degree, whereas in scalefree networks, most individuals have low degrees and a few individuals have very high degrees. For each type of network, we use standard versions of the networks as well as versions with increased degree assortativity (i.e. where nodes with the same number of links are preferentially connected to each other; also known as degree correlations or degree assortment). Real-world social networks are generally characterised by increased degree assortativity [31] , and such assortativity is particularly likely to affect the evolution of cooperation when strategy is correlated to degree, because it then affects the extent to which cooperators are connected to each other. The networks with increased degree assortativity are therefore likely to give us results that are more relevant for real social networks, whereas the standard networks provide us with results that are more directly comparable to other studies of cooperation in networks [14, 15] .
We study the evolution of cooperation in these networks for two commonly used formalisations of cooperative interactions, the Prisoner's Dilemma game and the Snowdrift game. The Prisoner's Dilemma game formalises a situation where behaving cooperatively in itself is not beneficial to the actor, and cooperation cannot survive in a well-mixed population (without special mechanisms). This game embodies the paradox of the evolution of cooperation. The Snowdrift game models a weaker social dilemma where behaving cooperatively in itself provides a benefit to the actor, and a well-mixed population in equilibrium can contain both cooperators and defectors.
II. METHODS
In order to investigate the effect of initial correlations between strategy and network position on the evolution of cooperation, we built an agent-based simulation model (implemented in MATLAB ). In the following we summarize the model framework, and we describe the networks, the different types of initial strategy distributions used, and our simulation procedures. To make the results comparable with other studies, the model framework follows commonly used standards for simulations of cooperation in networks. For further details and mathematical description of the model, we refer the reader to Section V (Model details).
A. Simulation model summary
The model simulates the evolution of cooperation in networks, where each node in the network corresponds to an individual and the links between the nodes determine who interacts with who. Each individual is either a cooperator or defector. While the network structure does not change throughout a simulation, the individuals change their strategies over time, and the main outcome of the simulation is the frequency of cooperators in the population after a set number of timesteps. Each timestep consists of an interaction phase, where all individuals connected by a direct link interact pairwise, and an update phase, where all individuals update their strategy adaptively.
In the interaction phase, each indiviual plays a single round of a cooperation game with each of its network neighbours (i.e. the individuals to whom it has a direct link), and gains fitness payoffs from the games that depend on its own strategy and that of the other player. Each individual accumulates the payoffs from all its games within that timestep. Individuals follow their current strategy, i.e. cooperators only cooperate and defectors only defect. The payoff values for each combination of strategies are determined by the game, which is either the Prisoner's Dilemma game or the Snowdrift game (i.e. separate simulations are run for each of the two games). For both games the payoffs are named as follows: A defector gets the temptation to defect T when playing against a cooperator and the punishment P when playing against another defector. A cooperator gets the reward R when playing against another cooperator and the sucker's payoff S when playing against a defector. Both games formalise a situation where there is a temptation to defect (modelled by setting T as the highest value, i.e. a defector playing against a cooperator gains the highest payoff), but if both individuals defect they are worse off than if they both cooperate (formal definitions of the games can be found in section V). To make our results comparable to those of seminal papers in the field (e.g. [9, 10, 17, 32] ), we use one-parameter versions of the two games, where the severity of the cooperative dilemma (i.e. how hard it is for cooperation to evolve, everything else equal) is determined by a single parameter. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, this parameter is called b and corresponds to the temptation to defect T ; in the Snowdrift game the parameter is called ρ and corresponds to the cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation (see Section V for details).
When all network neighbours have interacted, each individual determines whether to change its strategy, based on how well it did in the interaction phase in terms of its accumulated game payoffs (which is called its fitness). To make this decision, the individual follows the proportional imititation update rule ( [10, 32] , formalized in Section V) and compares its own fitness to that of a randomly picked network neighbour. If the individual has higher fitness than the neighbour, it keeps its current strategy. If it has lower fitness than the neighbour, it copies the strategy of the neighbour with a probability that is relative to the difference between the neighbour's fitness and its own.
B. Networks
We use four types of networks: standard versions of Poisson and scale-free networks, and versions of these networks with the same degree distributions but with increased degree assortativity. All networks have N = 10 3 nodes and an average degree ofd = 10, and we use only networks where all nodes are contained in a single component, i.e. all nodes are at least indirectly connected to each other.
The standard Poisson networks are of the Erdös-Renyi (ER) random network type [33] and the standard scalefree networks are of the Barabási-Albert (BA) type [34] . To generate versions of these networks with increased degree assortativity, we apply the algorithm introduced by Xulvi-Brunet and Sokolov [35] , which preserves the degree distribution of the network. The algorithm consists of iterated rewiring rounds. In each rewiring round, two links of the network are chosen uniformly at random and one of two rewiring schemes are carried out: (i) with probability p the links are rewired such that one link connects the two nodes of highest degree and one connects the two nodes of lowest degree (if this is not already the case); (ii) with probability 1 − p the links are rewired at random. The degree assortativity of the network can thus be controlled by varying p. We use p = 1 (i.e. maximal degree assortativity given the degree distribution and the condition of all nodes belonging to the same component).
The rewiring procedure must be repeated sufficiently many times that almost all links have been rewired, i.e. such that every link has been selected for rewiring with high probability. Denoting the total number of links in the network by L, after k iterations the probability that a given link has not yet been selected
number of links not yet selected is thus approximately Le
−2k/L . Requiring this number to be of order unity, we see that we need k ≈ L log(L)/2 iterations. To make sure we reach maximum assortativity for a given network, we take k = 10L log(L).
C. Initial strategy distributions
A key outcome of the simulations is how the fraction of cooperators evolves. Denoting the total number of nodes by N and the number of cooperators by N c , this fraction is r = N c /N . In the beginning of each simulation, a subset of nodes are assigned the cooperator strategy and the rest the defector strategy. The initial fraction of cooperators is r in . Following common convention we take r in = 1/2 (i.e. initially, half of the nodes are cooperators). In order to investigate how the initial distribution of strategies in the network affects the evolution of cooperation, we use three different strategy assignment rules:
(1) Uniform. N r in cooperator nodes are picked uniformly at random among all nodes. The remaining nodes are assigned the defector strategy. The probability for any given node to be a cooperator initially equals r in . This strategy assignment method gives a baseline for our investigations, where there is no correlation between strategy and degree.
(2) Stochastic by degree. Cooperator nodes are selected sequentially based on their relative degree. The first cooperator node is drawn among all nodes, with the probability of drawing node i given by d i / j d j , where d i is the degree of node i. Each subsequent cooperator node is drawn from the remaining set of nodes according to d i / j / ∈C d j , where C is the set of nodes which have already been selected. This is iterated until N r in nodes have been assigned the cooperator strategy. The remaining nodes are assigned the defector strategy [36] . This strategy assignment method creates correlation between strategy and degree, with cooperators placed preferentially on high-degree nodes, but with some stochasticity in the placement. 
D. Simulation procedures
We run simulations for all combinations of the four network types, the two games, and the three types of initial strategy distributions described above. For each of these combinations we run simulations for varying values of the game parameter b or ρ (i.e. for different severities of the cooperative dilemma). Following common convention we use parameter values across the intervals 1 ≤ b ≤ 2 and 0 < ρ ≤ 1. We run 50 replications for each setting, and all simulations have a total of t max = 10 4 timesteps. The final fraction of cooperators for a given setting is calculated as the average fraction in the last 100 timesteps of the 50 replications.
An example of a simulation run (i.e. a single replication) is shown in Fig. 1 . In this particular example, the cooperator fraction r drops from the initial value of 0.5 to close to zero at the end of the simulation, i.e. cooperation approaches extinction. The example is for Prisoner's Dilemma in a standard scale-free network, with stochastic by degree initial strategy distribution. The insets indicate that higher-degree nodes tend to be more likely to be cooperators, as expected under this type of strategy distribution.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We find that initially placing cooperators preferentially on high-degree nodes generally promotes cooperation in scale-free networks, whereas it has no effect in Poisson networks in most of the settings considered, with an interesting exception: as discussed below, placing cooperators on high-degree nodes can strongly promote cooperation in degree-assorted Poisson networks for the Prisoner's Dilemma, but this effect is sensitive to Trojan horses, i.e. defectors placed within clusters of cooperators.
The simulation results are summarised in Fig. 2 . For the standard networks (Fig. 2, top row) , the initial strategy distribution has an effect on cooperation only in the scale-free networks, for both of the games considered. For standard scale-free (BA) networks, when the initial cooperator distribution is changed from uniform to degreecorrelated (stochastically or deterministically), the average final cooperator fraction is increased for all b > 1 for Prisoner's Dilemma and for all ρ > 0.125 for the Snowdrift game. For standard Poisson (ER) networks, changing the initial strategy distribution has negligible effect for both games. Also, for both of the standard networks and both games, the stochastic and deterministic degreecorrelated initial distributions have similar effects. The presence of stochasticity in the degree-correlated placement of cooperators is thus not important in the standard networks. In these networks, the effect of the initial strategy placement mainly depends on the degree distribution (scale-free vs. Poisson), with similar effects for the two games and the two degree-correlated strategy distributions.
The picture is somewhat different for the networks with increased degree assortativity (Fig. 2 , bottom row of plots), which corresponds to more realistic social networks [31] . For degree-assorted scale-free networks, both of the degree-correlated initial distributions enhance cooperation for Prisoner's Dilemma, with the deterministic distribution having a larger effect. For the Snowdrift game, however, the effects in this network type are small and inconsistent. For degree-assorted Poisson networks, degree-correlated initial strategy distribution does not affect cooperation when there are errors (stochasticity) in the placement. In contrast, the deterministic degreecorrelated initial distribution has a large, positive effect for all b > 1 for Prisoner's Dilemma and also enhances cooperation for large ρ for the Snowdrift game. Hence, for the networks with increased degree assortativity, the effect of initially placing cooperators on high-degree nodes depends non-trivially on the combination of degree distribution, the game, and the presence of errors in the placement.
The increase in cooperation when cooperators are placed on high-degree nodes stems from the fact that nodes of higher degree have higher maximal fitness. This is because game payoffs for an individual in each timestep are accumulated from games against all neighbours, as described above (also c.f. Eq. (6) in Section V below). Since each node copies strategies only from neighbours with higher fitness, a cooperator can turn a defector neighbour into a cooperator only if it has higher fitness than the defector. Hence, intuitively, a higher maximal fitness for cooperators is likely to facilitate the spread of the cooperative strategy.
However, we see that placing cooperators on highdegree nodes does not always enhance cooperation. To better understand when such placement will have an effect, we may ask how the neighbourhoods of cooperators and defectors should differ in order for cooperators to attain higher fitness than defectors. The answer is that a cooperator generally needs to have considerably more cooperator neighbours than a defector does, to get a higher fitness than the defector. Specifically, consider a cooperator node of degree d with n cooperator neighbours and a defector node of degree d with n cooperator neighbours. The fitness of two such nodes for games with payoffs such as those used here (formalised in Eq. (5) in Section V) will be respectively
and
The cooperator has higher fitness than the defector when F > F . For the one-parameter Prisoner's Dilemma game, the payoffs are S = P = 0, R = 1, and T = b, and thus F > F if and only if n > bn .
That is, a cooperator must have b times as many cooperator neighbours as a defector to gain a higher fitness. For the one-parameter Snowdrift game, we have
, and P = 0. In this case F > F when
We see that for the Snowdrift game, the cooperator also benefits from a high number of cooperator neighbours, but a sufficiently high degree can compensate for a low number of cooperator neighbours. The inequality is always fulfilled for d = n (1+ρ)/(1−ρ). However, for costto-benefit ratios approaching 1 this diverges, and so in this regime n must again be larger than n . For the most severe instances of both games, i.e. for the parameter settings making it hardest for cooperation to evolve (b = 2 and ρ = 1), cooperators need to have more than twice as many cooperator neighbours as defectors to achieve higher fitness. Placing cooperators on high-degree nodes increases the chance that these requirements are satisfied and cooperators can withstand invasion from defector neighbours and spread their own strategy. Furthermore, the cooperators' higher number of links means that they are more likely to be picked as role models in the strategy-update phase (while this is not true for perfectly assorted networks, we checked that it holds true for all the network types used here). Combined with their higher maximal fitness this increases the cooperators' control over their neighbourhoods.
Given the above considerations, the more frequent effects of initial strategy distribution seen in the scale-free than in the Poisson networks may be attributed primarily to the difference in degree variation between these networks. Scale-free networks are characterized by the presence of nodes with a degree much higher than the average (the so-called hubs). This means that the placement of cooperators on high-degree nodes gives them a greater advantage in scale-free networks than in Poisson networks. Our results show that the effect of higher initial cooperator degrees on the difference in fitness between cooperators and their defector neighbours is too small in standard Poisson networks to affect the final outcome, whereas in standard scale-free networks the advantage cooperators obtain from being placed on hubs results in higher final fractions of cooperators compared to when strategies are initially randomly distributed.
The difference in effect of initial strategy placement between the two types of degree distribution is less clear when degree assortativity is increased, and the pattern of effects is overall less straightforward for the degreeassorted networks. This is likely to be primarily explained by what we will call the Trojan-horse effect. Under increased degree assortativity, because nodes of similar degree are preferentially connected to each other, initial placement of cooperators on higher-degree nodes will tend to create clusters of cooperators. Such clustering is in itself advantageous for cooperators, as they are then exposed to fewer defectors and obtain benefits from each other. However, direct connections between hubs also means that a defector hub can more easily exploit a cooperator hub [18] . This leads to degree assortativity generally having a net negative effect on cooperation.
In our simulations, in line with previous findings [18] , larger degree assortativity decreases cooperation in all cases (see Fig. 2 ), with one notable exception, namely for the Prisoners Dilemma under Poisson degree distribution and deterministic placement of cooperators on highdegree nodes (Fig. 2) . Here, cooperation does better in the degree-assorted network than in the corresponding standard network. Indeed, in the degree-assorted Poisson network, relatively high levels of cooperation are supported throughout the game parameter range. In contrast, stochastic placement of cooperators on high-degree nodes has no observable effect here. This pattern is likely to stem from the fact that when the placement is deterministic, cooperators and defectors are neighbouring each other only in one of the clusters created by the increased degree assortativity, i.e. there is a clear invasion front, with the remaining cooperator clusters being shielded from defectors. In contrast, when the placement of the cooperators on high-degree nodes is not perfect, the higher-degree clusters of cooperators are likely to contain Trojan horses in the form of defectors that have by chance been placed on high-degree nodes. Hence, in this case invasion by defectors can not only happen from the invasion front but also from within the higher-degree cooperator clusters. The difference between the deterministic and stochastic initial placement of cooperators on high-degree nodes is shown in Fig. 3 . It can be seen that for the stochastic placement, the level of stochasticity created by the particular algorithm used here means that the invasion front is dissolved and even the highestdegree cooperator cluster contains Trojan horses in the form of defectors. Increased degree assortment thus tends to induce differences in the effect of stochastic and deterministic placement of cooperators on high-degree nodes. Our results show that the presence or absence of errors in the initial strategy placement can have major effects on the evolution of cooperation, in particular in degreeassorted networks because this is where the Trojan-horse effect can make a difference.
Interestingly, the cooperator fractions in the degreeassorted Poisson network under the Prisoner's dilemma and deterministic initial distribution are higher than in the corresponding scale-free network (Fig. 2, bottom  left) . This is opposite to the pattern found for standard Poisson and scale-free networks (Fig. 2 upper left, and previous results, e.g. [17] ), where cooperation does best under scale-free degree distribution. This underlines that the extent to which a network structure supports cooperation depends on the combination of multiple structural factors.
IV. CONCLUSION
Initial conditions can have important effects on the evolution of cooperation in networks, but they have not been investigated much. Our results show that the effect of initially placing cooperators on high-degree nodes depends on the combination of degree distribution, degree assortativity, and presence of errors in the placement of cooperators. The study underlines that strategy distribution is an important factor for the evolution of cooperation, and implies that the effect of initial correlation between strategy and degree is important to consider in real-world experiments of cooperation when the network structure differs from standard (Erdös-Rényi) Poisson networks.
V. MODEL DETAILS
The model simulates the dynamics of a cooperative strategy in static network structures, with interactions between individuals (nodes) occurring across the network edges. Each individual adopts one of multiple strategies defined by a game which models their interaction. The time evolution is discrete, with each timestep consisting of an interaction phase and a strategy update phase.
We focus on two-player, symmetric games with a binary choice of strategies, as is commonly done in models of cooperation. The strategies are labelled 'cooperate' and 'defect', and the game is determined by the following payoff matrix
Here, the row and column determine the strategies of the two players respectively, and the entries define the payoffs for the row player. The game is symmetric in the sense that the payoffs for the other player are given by an identical matrix. For each node i in the network, we will denote the strategy adopted by the corresponding individual by s i . The payoff for individual i when playing against individual j is then M sisj . Within a timestep, each individual plays a single game round against each neighbour, and we define an individual's fitness in a given timestep to be the sum of the payoffs received in all the games against its neighbours in that timestep. That is, for an individual defined by a node i, the fitness is
where N i is the set of neighbouring nodes of i. Two well-known instances of games of the above form are the Prisoner's Dilemma game and the Snowdrift game. These are both characterized by having T as the highest payoff, giving a temptation to defect. In Prisoner's Dilemma, the worst outcome is to be defected upon while cooperating, with the order of the payoffs being T > R > P > S, whereas in the Snowdrift game, the worst is to be defected upon while defecting, with the payoff order being T > R > S > P . Note that in Prisoner's Dilemma, the strategy with the highest individual payoff is to defect regardless of the opponent's strategy. In unstructured populations (corresponding to networks where all nodes are connected directly to each other), evolution therefore selects for defection and cooperation does not survive. In the Snowdrift game, the best payoff depends on the opponent's strategy, and cooperation and defection can co-exist in unstructured populations. In our simulations, we use common one-parameter versions of the two games (e.g. [9, 10, 17, 32] ). For Prisoner's Dilemma, we set R = 1 and P = S = 0, and the game is parametrised by the benefit to defectors b = T . For b = 1 there is no dilemma while larger values represent larger temptation to defect (making it harder for cooperation to evolve). As is often done, we take 1 ≤ b ≤ 2. The Snowdrift game is parameterized by the cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation 0 < ρ ≤ 1, with T = Strategy update is synchronous and follows the frequently used proportional imitation update rule [10, 32] . For an individual defined by node i, a neighbour j is chosen uniformly at random from the set of neighbours N i . If the neighbour has higher fitness than i, that is F j > F i , then i adopts its strategy with probability
where d i denotes the degree of node i, and D is the largest possible difference in payoffs for two players in a single game round (i.e. D = T − S for Prisoner's Dilemma and D = T − P for Snowdrift). The denominator ensures normalisation of the probability. We note that the above update rule corresponds to replicator dynamics adjusted to structured, finite populations [10, 32, 37] . Also note that the update phase can alternatively be interpreted as reproduction, in which case each timestep is a generation.
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